From individual to group hatred: why this is a different matter
Part 1 of this series approached hatred as an individual psychological construct — a stable negative attitude toward a specific person or object, rooted in personal history, attachment, and personality functioning. This second part enters different territory: hatred as an attitude toward a category of people, as an ideological stance, as a component of a radicalization process.
This is not simply "more of the same." Interpersonal hatred often grows out of concrete experience — betrayal, humiliation, loss. Group hatred is structurally different: its object is not an individual person, but an abstract category, such as ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. The individual may have little direct experience with members of that group, or may interpret such experience selectively through pre-existing schemas. The psychological mechanisms overlap — devaluation, projection, dehumanization, and the need for group cohesion — but the context, dynamics, and clinical and forensic implications are substantially different. Classic social psychology adds a further layer: group hatred is also shaped by in-group/out-group dynamics, perceived threat, and the need to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
The article is structured as follows: the section Clarifying the terminology introduces the conceptual frame; Is group hatred psychopathology? addresses the key diagnostic question and delimits the legitimate role of forensic psychology; Psychological models of radicalization presents four research-based frameworks; What psychodiagnostics can and cannot detect spells out the diagnostic possibilities and their limits; Where psychology needs sociology points to the interdisciplinary boundaries; and the closing section summarizes the practical implications.
Clarifying the terminology: hate, bias, extremism, radicalization
The conceptual field around group hatred is extraordinarily crowded in both professional and public discourse. For a psychologist working in a clinical or forensic context, it is essential to distinguish between terms that carry different legal, sociological, and psychological connotations.
- Bias-motivated crime (hate crime): An umbrella term for offenses motivated by prejudice toward the victim's actual or perceived group membership. International bodies such as the OSCE define hate crimes as criminal acts committed with a bias motive (OSCE/ODIHR, 2009). In many legal systems, bias motivation may operate on several levels at once: as an aggravating circumstance at sentencing, as an element of specific stand-alone offenses (such as incitement to hatred or group defamation), and as a qualifying feature that increases the statutory penalty for offenses such as homicide or assault. The protected characteristics vary by jurisdiction and may include race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age, or social status; many systems have broadened them in recent years. For the psychologist, it matters which of these layers is in play, because each puts different questions to the expert.
- Hate speech: A jurisdiction-dependent legal and political category referring to expression that degrades, threatens, or incites hatred, discrimination, or violence against a group. The threshold between protected and unlawful expression differs markedly between countries. The psychological contribution lies in analyzing the person's intent, cognitive schemas, and emotion regulation.
- Extremism: Not a universally defined clinical or legal category. In the European context in particular, it usually denotes beliefs and practices radically opposed to fundamental democratic values. It is broader than terrorism and includes nonviolent forms. Psychologically, it is an attitude, not a diagnosis.
- Radicalization: A process concept representing the gradual shift from moderate attitudes toward extremist ones, potentially leading to a willingness to use violence. It is a psychosocial process, not a single rupture. This processual character is crucial — it makes it possible to speak of early intervention, risk assessment, and predictors.
- Terrorism: A behavioral and legal category defined by the use or threat of violence for political, ideological, or religious ends. The psychological profile of the terrorist is, in research terms, highly heterogeneous; there is no single "terrorist type."
This distinction is not academic formalism. In clinical and forensic practice, it matters which phenomenon we are talking about: whether we are assessing attitudes, behavior, motivation, or the risk of future conduct — and each of these tasks requires different tools and a different frame.
Is group hatred psychopathology?
This is the most important question a psychologist must ask in this context — and the answer is not self-evident.
The clinical perspective: radicalization is not a diagnosis
Most available studies find no simple psychopathological core to extremism as such (Gill et al., 2014; Corner & Gill, 2015). The conclusions, however, vary with the type of sample: research on group offenders or on suspects who have not been convicted does not always agree with studies of convicted lone actors, among whom a higher incidence of certain mental disorders has been documented somewhat more frequently. In short: the attempt to find a universal psychopathological profile of the radicalized person is empirically untenable. Radicalization is a psychosocial phenomenon, not a psychiatric diagnosis.
This has direct practical consequences. A psychologist who looks for a diagnosis where there is none may both fail to assess the real risk and illegitimately pathologize a belief that, however socially destructive or morally reprehensible, is not in itself a mental disorder. At the same time, certain mental disorders or personality vulnerabilities may contribute to radicalization — not as its primary cause, but as factors that increase vulnerability within a specific social and ideological context. Paranoid traits, narcissistic vulnerability, depression bound up with a sense of humiliation, or personality disorders affecting the regulation of anger may all form a relevant context.
The psychologist's expertise lies in assessing functional impacts: cognitive rigidity, moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999), the capacity for empathy, impulsivity, and anger regulation. The forensic psychologist speaks to these features of personality functioning — not to the legal classification of the motive, which falls exclusively to the investigating and prosecuting authorities and the court.
The forensic perspective: motivation, criminal responsibility, risk of violence
In forensic psychology, the theme of group hatred most often enters in three situations. The first is the assessment of psychological motivation: the court may need assistance in evaluating whether group hatred plausibly played a role in the offense. The psychologist does not determine the legal classification of the motive; rather, they describe the assessed person's personality structure, cognitive schemas, emotional dynamics, and attitudes, which may support or weaken the hypothesis of bias motivation. The second situation is the assessment of criminal responsibility: in cases of serious violence, the influence of a psychotic disorder or another state reducing or excluding responsibility must be ruled out. The third — and clinically most complex — is the assessment of the risk of violence and reoffending.
What an expert opinion can deliver in the context of extremism:
- A description of personality structure and cognitive style (rigidity, a tendency toward dichotomous thinking, moral disengagement).
- An assessment of the role of any mental disorder (where one exists) in the context of the offense.
- An evaluation of motivational dynamics (receptiveness to ideology, group influence vs. autonomous conviction).
- Risk factors for reoffending or escalation (structured according to HCR-20v3 or VERA-2R).
- Protective factors (social bonds, motivation to change, capacity for empathy).
- Recommendations for management and intervention.
Where the limits of psychological competence lie:
A psychologist in a clinical or forensic context is neither an ideology expert nor a social analyst. Questions such as "why is this ideology attractive to certain groups" or "how do radicalization networks function" are legitimate, but they belong primarily to sociology, political science, and criminology. Interdisciplinary cooperation here is a necessity, not a choice.
Psychological models of radicalization
For the clinical and forensic psychologist, psychological models of radicalization are useful not as diagnostic algorithms but as structured frameworks for understanding the individual case. A general caveat is in order: radicalization research often suffers from a serious methodological problem. Most models (including those described below) are based on case studies, second-hand documents (manifestos), or laboratory research on students rather than on direct research with actual offenders. This primary data problem limits empirical conclusions and calls for caution when applying models to specific forensic cases.
Significance Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2009, 2017)
This model is among the most cited psychological theories of radicalization. It proceeds from the assumption that the key motivational engine of radicalization is the need for personal significance and meaning. Radicalization occurs when an individual experiences a loss of significance (humiliation, marginalization, failure) and an ideology offers a path to restore it: I will become someone who fights for a higher cause.
Clinical relevance: with forensic clients who have an extremist history, it is worth exploring what preceded radicalization — what humiliation or loss of status was subjectively experienced. The model explains well why individuals are especially vulnerable in adolescence, after job loss, after family breakdown, or after migration. It connects well with the narcissistic injury described in Part 1.
The 3N Model (Kruglanski et al., 2019)
An extension of the previous model into three components: Need (the need for significance), Narrative (an ideological narrative that legitimizes group hatred and violence as a means of restoring dignity), and Network (a social network that reinforces the narrative and rewards conformity). Radicalization occurs when all three components mutually reinforce one another.
Forensic use: the model helps structure the case history. The psychologist can systematically map which component was dominant and in what order it entered the process. This is relevant for assessing the degree of autonomous conviction versus group pressure and conformity, which can bear on the evaluation of both motivation and prognosis.
The Pyramid Model (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008)
This model highlights an empirically important fact: a large number of people share extremist attitudes, but only a small fraction move on to violent behavior. The Pyramid Model distinguishes several levels — from sympathizers through activists to perpetrators of violence — and stresses that the transition between levels is not automatic.
Clinical and forensic relevance: the model warns against simplistically equating extremist belief with the risk of violence. A psychologist assessing the risk of violence must distinguish where on the pyramid the client stands and what factors might encourage or, conversely, inhibit the transition to action. Belief alone is not a sufficient predictor of behavior.
The Staircase to Terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005)
A process model describing radicalization as a gradual ascent up a staircase: from the experience of injustice and powerlessness, through the search for someone to blame and identification with an extremist group, to moral disengagement from violence as an acceptable means. The model has intuitive heuristic value for structuring forensic assessment, but empirical testing on real offender populations remains limited.
What psychodiagnostics can and cannot detect
Psychodiagnostics cannot and should not identify someone as an "extremist." It can, however, assess psychological traits and vulnerabilities that, in combination with a conducive ideological and social environment, may increase susceptibility to radicalization — or influence motivation, criminal responsibility, and prognosis in individuals already involved in extremist conduct.
Cognitive rigidity and closure
The need for cognitive closure (NCC — Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) is a stable individual trait denoting a tendency toward unambiguous answers, intolerance of ambiguity, and resistance to new information. A substantial body of research suggests that NCC is associated with susceptibility to ideologies that offer clear, unambiguous answers.
An important methodological disclaimer: NCC is measured directly neither by the MMPI-2 nor by projective methods. For direct research measurement, Webster's NCC scale is used. Clinical instruments can point to related traits — cognitive rigidity, black-and-white thinking, paranoid personality organization — that correlate with NCC but are not a validated substitute for it. On the MMPI-2, indirect indicators might include elevations on the OBS, Pa, or CYN scales, depending on the broader profile configuration. On the Rorschach, low Complexity or patterns suggesting restricted, rigid, or poorly differentiated processing (in R-PAS terms) may be clinically relevant, but only as indirect contextual information — not as a diagnostic criterion for a predisposition to radicalization.
Authoritarianism and dominance
Two constructs are well established here in the research literature: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA — Altemeyer, 1981) captures a tendency toward submission to authority and the punishment of those who deviate from group norms; Social Dominance Orientation (SDO — Pratto et al., 1994) measures a preference for a hierarchical ordering of society and acceptance of group inequality. The two constructs predict prejudice and group hostility independently of one another, and their combination is a strong predictor of extremist attitudes. The direct standardized instruments (the RWA and SDO scales) are not part of routine clinical practice, but for specialized forensic assessment they are methodologically relevant.
Identity vulnerability and sensitivity to humiliation
In line with Significance Quest Theory, it is clinically important to assess how the client ties their self-esteem to group membership and how they react to a perceived threat to group identity. Within a diagnostic portfolio, this can be captured through a combination of the MMPI-2 (the profile configuration in borderline or paranoid organization; the Pa, CYN, and ASP scales), the Rorschach (a rigid self-image, persecutory themes, projective processes), and the TAT (analysis of narratives with themes of humiliation, revenge, and group belonging). None of these instruments offers a direct assessment of radicalization risk — they offer a psychological picture that must be interpreted in the context of the overall clinical evaluation.
Assessing the risk of violence: structured clinical approaches
In forensic practice, assessing the risk of violent extremist conduct is a specialized discipline. Alongside general violence risk-assessment instruments (HCR-20v3; Douglas, Hart, Webster, & Belfrage, 2013), there is a tool specific to this area: VERA-2R (Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, Version 2 Revised; Pressman, Duits, Rinne, & Flockton, 2016). VERA-2R is a Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ) instrument. It does not yield an actuarial probability score but structures clinical reasoning about the risk and protective factors specific to extremist violence: ideological belief and identification, social context, history of violence, psychological variables, and planning.
VERA-2R places a strong emphasis on ideological and contextual factors, underscoring the interdisciplinary nature of the assessment. A psychologist without specific training in SPJ instruments and without familiarity with the context of extremist ideologies should either work with someone who has that training or decline the assignment.
Where psychology needs sociology — and vice versa
An honest acknowledgment of limits is part of professional competence. Psychology explains predispositions and individual mechanisms: why a particular individual, with a particular history and personality structure, adopted a particular ideology at a particular moment in their life.
What psychology on its own does not explain: why certain ideologies arise and spread under certain historical and social conditions; how radicalization networks function; how the media and online environment facilitate radicalization; why some socioeconomic groups are more affected. These questions belong to sociology, political science, and criminology.
In practice, this means that a high-quality forensic assessment in cases of extremist violence is an interdisciplinary undertaking. Specialized counter-terrorism and interagency bodies can provide a platform for such cooperation, though the systematic interdisciplinary integration of expert practice remains more an aspiration than a standard.
Practical implications for clinical and forensic practice
Group hatred and extremism are not primarily clinical diagnoses, but psychology has a legitimate and irreplaceable role in this field: describing individual functioning, assessing the functional implications of an ideology, evaluating criminal responsibility, and reasoning in a structured way about the risk of violence.
Predisposing traits that psychodiagnostic methods may assess or suggest — cognitive rigidity, identity vulnerability, sensitivity to humiliation, paranoid or narcissistic personality organization — are clinically relevant contextual information. They are not a diagnostic criterion for extremism, but they are part of a comprehensive picture of the individual that helps the court or the commissioning party understand the context.
Forensic assessment in the area of extremist violence requires specific training: familiarity with SPJ instruments (HCR-20v3, VERA-2R), an understanding of the psychological models of radicalization, and the ability to cooperate with specialists from other disciplines. A psychologist without this grounding should decline the assignment or consult.
The key issue is an awareness of limits. A psychologist who approaches extremism with clinical instruments alone, and without sufficient contextual knowledge, risks either pathologizing what is not pathological or overlooking a real risk. Group dynamics, ideology, and social context are not secondary background variables; in many cases they are just as important as personality structure.
References
- Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. University of Manitoba Press.
- American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425787
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193–209. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0303_3
- Corner, E., & Gill, P. (2015). A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor terrorism. Law and Human Behavior, 39(1), 23–34. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000102
- Douglas, K. S., Hart, S. D., Webster, C. D., & Belfrage, H. (2013). HCR-20v3: Assessing risk for violence — User guide. Mental Health, Law, and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University.
- Gill, P., Horgan, J., & Deckert, P. (2014). Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone-actor terrorists. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(2), 425–435. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12312
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- Kruglanski, A. W., Jasko, K., Chernikova, M., Dugas, M., & Webber, D. (2017). To the fringe and back: Violent extremism and the psychology of deviance. American Psychologist, 72(3), 217–230. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000091
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- McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration. American Psychologist, 60(2), 161–169. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161
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- Pressman, D. E., Duits, N., Rinne, T., & Flockton, J. (2016). VERA-2R: Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, Version 2 Revised — A structured professional judgement approach. Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP/DJI).
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole.
- Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049–1062. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.1049
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This article is part of a series devoted to the psychology of hatred. Part 1 deals with individual hatred, its definition, and the diagnostic tools available.
This blog is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for professional psychological, psychiatric, or legal advice.
